Page 35 - Service Delivery Review_Volume 14_Number 3_2022
P. 35

N W Sec 100 Intervention




       North West Section 100 Intervention



       Four Years Later…






       Minister for Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), Dr Nkosazana
       Dlamini-Zuma, reflects on the journey, progress and emerging lessons learned in what
       is to date the biggest and most comprehensive administrative intervention in the provin-
       cial sphere by the national government.

       Triggers to the sec 100 intervention                   So far, the section 100 intervention in the North West Prov-
                                                              ince is the most extensive and complex undertaken in South
       April  of 2022  marks the  fourth  annivesary  of  the  events   Africa. Cabinet decided on 9 May 2018 to invoke this sec-
       in the North West province that triggered the need for the   tion for the entire provincial government, after having placed
       rarely invoked Section 100 of the Constitution. This section   the highly challenged North West Department of Health un-
       empowers the national government to intervene in the ad-  der section 100(1) (b) of the Constitution on 25 April 2018.
       ministrative affairs of another sphere should they deem it   Five departments, including the Office of the Premier, were
       to be failing in discharging its constitutional mandates. In   placed under the direct control of national ministers in terms
       April 2018, the failures and near collapse of governance and   of section 100(1) (b), while ministerial directives were issued
       public  administration in the North West province  played   to five more departments in terms of section 100(1) (a). Sec-
       themselves out in chaotic and traumatic scenes in towns   tions (b) and (a) are distinguished from each other by the in-
       and villages. The crisis saw the collapse of critical services   tensity of the intervention, ranging from full to partial control.
       that were manifested in the following:
                                                              Modus Operandi
       ■      Violent labour unrest and community protests
              paralysing service delivery and destroying life and    An Inter-Ministerial Task Team (IMTT), made up of the min-
              property                                        isters corresponding to the departments under administra-
       ■      Health system collapse requiring the intervention of   tion, exercises executive authority for the section 100(1) in-
              the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)  tervention. The IMTT is accountable to Cabinet and subject
       ■      School children kept out of schooling           to the oversight of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP)
                                                              and the cooperation of the Provincial Executive Committee
       ■      Audit results showing a year-on-year decline for   (EXCO). Operationally, the intervention is run by a Technical
              four straight years with the Auditor General noting a   Task Team (TTT) of the Directors-General.  In turn, the TTT is
              refusal to deal with issues raised, such as     supported by their respective administrators and the teams
              non-compliance with supply chain management     that carry out the various intervention plans set in motion.
              laws and a persistent lack of consequence       These  interventions were based on diagnostic  reports,
              management                                      memoranda, operational protocols and plans with clear tar-
       ■      Systematic outsourcing of service delivery to   gets and timelines across the entire province.
              irregularly appointed project management units,
              involving hundreds of millions of rand          High-level progress
       ■      Municipal services in a state of collapse, requiring
              the intervention of the SANDF in certain cases.  Since the start of the intervention in May 2018, significant
                                                              progress  has  been  made. Most notable  is the  social  and
       Historic in scale and complexity                       institutional stability, without which good governance and
                                                              service delivery is bound to be a casualty. For the first time
       Putting an entire province under section 100 had not hap-  in almost four years, national and provincial governments
       pened before. In the early 2000s, the national government   were in unison and spoke with one voice, acknowledging
       had intervened in several departments (education and so-  that the intervention had brought stability. The appointment
       cial development among them) in the Eastern Cape Prov-  of committed and ethical Heads of Department (HoDs) and
       ince. However, the most extensive use of section 100(1)   the reaffirmation of the role of other senior managers in en-
       before 2018 was in Limpopo Province,  when Cabinet in-  suring good governance are key to the sustainability of the
       voked section 100(1) intervention in five provincial depart-  post-intervention administration.
       ments between 5 December 2011 and 15 December 2014.







                                                                  Volume 14 No.3 of 2022 | SERVICE DELIVERY REVIEW  35
   30   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   38   39   40